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Continuous operation of high bit rate quantum key distribution
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We demonstrate a quantum key distribution with a secure bit rate exceeding 1 Mbit/s over 50 km fiber
averaged over a continuous 36-hours period. Continuous operation of high bit rates is achieved using feedback
systems to control path length difference and polarization in the interferometer and the timing of the detection
windows. High bit rates and continuous operation allows finite key size effects to be strongly reduced, achieving
a key extraction efficiency of 96% compared to keys of infinite lengths.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd Quantum Cryptography; 85.60.Gz Photo detectors; 85.60.Gw Photodiodes;
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unprece-
dented security for communication.1–4 The security is
based on physical laws rather than the supposed diffi-
culty of computing certain mathematical problems. The
BB84 protocol1 has been proven unconditionally secure
against the most general attacks by several different
approaches.5–8 In combination with decoy pulses,9–11 se-
cure key distribution has been made possible using prac-
tical components, such as weak laser pulses. Moreover,
recent works deal robustly with keys of finite size12 and
also guarantee composable security,13 an important prop-
erty if the key is to be used in an actual cryptographic
implementation.
Experimentally, distribution of secure keys has been
demonstrated at rates exceeding 1 Mbit/s between two
parties separated by several kilometers.14,15 When com-
bined with the one-time pad cipher this enables commu-
nication to be encrypted at this rate with ultimate secu-
rity. However, it is often the case, including in these high
speed reports, that key distribution is only possible for a
short period of time. In this “one shot” mode extensive
set up and calibration must be performed prior to a short
key exchange, after which time re-calibration is required.
In addition, key rates of 1 Mbit/s are typically reached
only over short fiber distances (around 10 km), and fall
rapidly beyond this.14,15
The first security proofs5–8 for the BB84 protocol, and
for almost all other protocols, are valid only for keys of
infinite length. In practice, keys have a finite length
and so parameters estimated from the key distribution
have some statistical fluctuations. To guarantee security
these fluctuations must be taken account of in the secu-
rity proof in a pessimistic way, reducing the secure key
rate compared to the infinite key case. This finite key
size effect creates a dependence between key size and se-
cure key rate; keys of greater size have smaller statistical
fluctuations and so less reduction in secure rate.
The key efficiency (the secure key rate compared to
the infinite key case) is a function of the key size and
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hence the session duration. It drops rapidly when the
number of pulses sent becomes less than 1011 according
to our simulation for a 50-km fiber distance. To reach
a key efficiency of 95%, the number of pulses must be
greater than 7.5× 1011. This translates to a session du-
ration of longer than one day for a megahertz-clocked
QKD system.16 Even for a high speed system,14 a key
generation time on the order of 10 minutes is required.
Previously, all the Mb/s systems can be operated con-
tinuously only for less than one minute due to the in-
stability of the quantum optics. Clearly for efficient key
generation it is crucial for a QKD system to operate at
a gigahertz clocked rate and with long term stability.
Here, we have implemented the BB84 protocol in a
high speed system built using robust commercially avail-
able components and able to operate continuously at high
speed. As is becoming standard in QKD implementa-
tions based on the BB84 protocol we use weak-pulse de-
coy states10,11 to reduce the systems susceptibility, and
thus secure key cost, to all physically possible attacks,
and in particular to photon number splitting attacks.17
We have developed a stable GHz QKD system, out-
lined in Fig. 1. A fiber laser pulsed at 1 GHz produces
1550 nm photon pulses with a 15 ps width. A LiNbO3
fiber intensity modulator creates the different pulse inten-
sities required for the decoy protocol. The information
is encoded on the photons phase using an asymmetrical
Mach-Zender interferometer, with a phase modulator lo-
cated in one arm. The total photon flux is measured
using a beam splitter just before transmission into the
fiber, and maintained at the correct level using a com-
puter controlled variable attenuator. The photons are
transmitted through 50 km of single-mode fiber with a
measured attenuation loss of 0.2 dB/km. After trans-
mission through the fiber the photons pass through a
four-channel electronic polarization controller, to correct
for any polarization drift in the fiber, and then Bob’s
interferometer. One arm contains a phase modulator
for basis selection while the other arm contains a fiber
stretcher. The fiber stretcher enables the path length to
be continually altered to maintain the same path differ-
ence as in Alice’s interferometer. The photons are de-
tected by InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) gated
in Geiger mode at 1 GHz and cooled to -30 ◦C using
2FIG. 1. Schematic of QKD system. IM denotes fiber intensity modulator, PM phase modulator, A attenuator, M optical power
meter, AMZI asymmetric Mach-Zender interferometer, EPC electrically-driven polarization controller, FS fiber stretcher, D
InGaAs APD detectors. Components in green are feedback-controlled as part of the active stabilization system.
a Peltier cooler, with an efficiency of 16.5% and a dark
count probability of 9 × 10−6 per gate. The APDs out-
put is processed using the self-differencing technique,23
which enables much smaller avalanches to be detected
and thus suppresses afterpulses, allowing for operation
at high gating speeds.
A complete active stabilization scheme is implemented
to enable the system to compensate for condition
changes, allowing QKD sessions over arbitrarily long time
durations. This ability is crucial to minimize the effect
of secure key rate reduction due to the finite key size.
Instabilities can be divided into two categories: (i) cod-
ing instability due to fiber length variations in Alice and
Bob’s encoder and decoder respectively, and (ii) channel
transmission instability due to polarization and arrival
time drifts in the quantum channel. The former adds
to the quantum bit error rate (QBER), while the lat-
ter causes a drop in the bit rate. The coding instability
is corrected for by using the fiber stretcher to continu-
ally alter the path difference in Bob’s decoder to ensure
it matches Alice’s encoder.19 This fiber stretcher is con-
trolled using the QBER as a feedback signal. When the
error rate is minimized the differences in interferometer
path lengths are eliminated.
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FIG. 2. Secure key rate as a function of time over a continuous
36 hour period for a fiber distance of 50 km.
There are two time varying parameters contributing to
the transmission instability: the length and polarization
characteristics of the transmission fiber linking Alice and
Bob. Drift in the fiber length leads to the photon arrival
time at the detectors moving outside of the active time
window, reducing the bit rate. Drift in the polarization
leads to photons traveling through non-interfering paths,
either through both long arms or both short arms in Al-
ice and Bob’s interferometers, and thus reducing the bit
rate. To compensate for these drifts, the detector count
rates are used as a feedback signal to adjust the delay
position of the detector gate as well as the polarization
controller state. The active stabilization operates contin-
uously alongside key distribution, and as such there is no
duty cycle or key rate reduction due to its use.
The decoy BB84 protocol10,11 with three different
pulse intensities is implemented. Signal pulses (µ = 0.5
photons per pulse, sent with 98.83% probability) are used
for distributing the key while two different decoy pulses
(ν1 = 0.1 and ν2 = 0.0007 photons per pulse sent with
0.78% and 0.39% probability respectively) are used only
to characterize the quantum channel, to prevent photon
number splitting attacks. The photon fluxes and trans-
mission probabilities were found using numerical simula-
tions to optimize the secure key rate. We implement a
recently developed finite key version13 of Koashi’s secu-
rity proof7 based on the uncertainty principle. The keys
generated using this proof have universally composable
security,20 with each key having a chosen failure prob-
ability of ǫ, and it also does not assume an underlying
Gaussian distribution for statistics, instead utilizing the
full binomial distribution.21 Here, we choose ǫ = 10−7.
Figure 2 shows the secure key distribution rate as a
function of time, obtained over a period of 36 hours con-
tinuous operation. A secure key is distilled every 20 min-
utes, a time duration that is sufficiently long to achieve
96% of the theoretical key rate for an infinitely long QKD
session. A total key size of 1.3 × 1011 bits is distributed
at an average secure key rate of 1.002 Mbit/s. This rate
is a factor of two to three orders of magnitude improve-
ment as compared to the stable SECOQC network,22 and
a factor of four higher than the previous record obtained
with a non-stabilized system.14
3FIG. 3. (Top) Quantum bit error rate (QBER) as a function
of time for signal and decoy pulses separately. The instanta-
neous value calculated every second is shown as points, with
the aggregate value used for key distillation every 20 mins
shown as the solid lines. (Bottom) Voltage of the fiber
stretcher, located in Bob’s interferometer, over the same pe-
riod.
Figure 3 shows the QBERs, including both instanta-
neous and average values. The instantaneous values were
determined per second and used to stabilize the interfer-
ometer path lengths, while the average QBER indicates
the value aggregated over 20 minutes and is used for dis-
tilling the secure key. While the effects of statistical fluc-
tuations can be clearly seen on the instantaneous QBER
of the decoy states (the count rate of the second decoy
state is only a few hundred counts per second), the sta-
bility of the rate is remarkable, with no spikes outside of
expected statistical fluctuations evident. The mean sig-
nal error rate is 3.85%, with 90% of values within 10% of
this, and no value measured above 6.86% for the entire
36 hour period.
Figure 4 shows the transmittance (detection probabil-
ity per pulse sent) of the signal and decoy states. Both
the per second rates (points) and aggregate rates (lines)
are stable over both the short and long term; without ac-
tive stabilization the transmittances slowly decrease over
tens of minutes (not shown) due to polarization drift in
the fiber, before falling to near zero after a few hours
due to the photon time of arrival shifting outside of the
detection gate.
Finally, we comment on the source requirement for
decoy protocols. The first prerequisite is the indistin-
guishability of signal and decoy pulses in both spectral
and time domains. This is ensured by the use of a single
laser with intensity modulation. The second prerequisite
is the stability of the light source intensities.23,24 In this
experiment, the total intensity transmitted is controlled
by a feedback loop. The ratio of decoy to signal count
FIG. 4. (Top) Transmittance (detection probability per gate)
as a function of time for signal and decoy pulses separately.
The instantaneous value calculated every second is shown as
points, with the aggregate value used for key distillation every
20 mins shown as the solid lines. (Bottom) Voltage of each of
the 4 channels of Bob’s polarisation controller over the same
period.
rate is stable with a standard deviation of less than 0.5%
among all QKD sessions, suggesting a precise control of
source intensities.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a QKD system
able to operate continuously and autonomously over long
periods of time, at a record key distribution rate of 1
Mbit/s over 50 km of fiber. We believe the stable and
high speed implementation, achieved using only commer-
cially available and robust devices, in particular InGaAs
APDs, is highly suitable for practical implementations.
The authors thank V. Scarani for useful discussions on
QKD with finite resources.
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